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On the Notion of Kaidaoyi (*Avakāśadānāśraya) as Discussed in 
Xuanzang’s Cheng weishi lun1 
Junjie Chu 
1   Introduction 
In Xuanzang’s (玄奘, 602–664) Cheng weishi lun (成唯識論, hereafter 
CWSL), a kind of digest of commentarial materials on Vasubandu’s Triṃ-
śikākārikā (hereafter TrK), in the context of an explanation of the basis 
(āśraya) of the seventh awareness, i.e. the defiled mind, a general discus-
sion of the three bases of thought and thought concomitants (cittacaitta) 
is presented, namely, *hetupratyayāśraya, *adhipatipratyayāśraya, and 
*samanantarapratyayāśraya (cf. below §3.1. and n. 28). In the case of the 
third basis, the whole discussion is interestingly held under the heading 
of kaidaoyi (開導依, literally, “opening-leading basis”, or “basis in terms 
of opening the way for the subsequent awareness and leading it to arise”, 
cf. Kuiji’s explanation quoted below in n. 5). Three different opinions 
concerning the interpretation of this special term are presented, with 
sources to back each up, and detailed argumentation on the issues at the 
center of the debate. This discussion is important because it concerns 
the way we should understand this technical term, which is otherwise 
called the “similar-immediate condition” (samanantarapratyaya), as it is 
in the Abhidharma system. That is to say, this discussion is related to the 
controversy about the function of the awareness in the antecedent mo-
-------------------------------------------------- 
1 I am indebted to Ven. Prof. Dhammajoti, who read an earlier version of this paper and 
made valuable suggestions, especially on discussion relating to the Abhidharma system. 
I am also indebted to Dr. Michael Radich, whose numerous suggestions improved my 
English and made the presentation more clear and precise. 
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ment, in respect of the awareness subsequent to it, namely the contro-
versy about the relationship between two kinds of awareness in a 
thought series (cittasaṃtāna), such as sensory awareness and mental a-
wareness. This topic was hotly discussed in the Buddhist epistemological 
school beginning with Dignāga (c. 480–540), which flourished particular-
ly with Dharmakīrti (c. 600–660).  
The main purpose of this paper is to examine the meaning of the two 
elements of the term kaidaoyi, namely kaidao and yi, analyzing their pos-
sible origin in the Indian sources of both the Abhidharma and the Yogā-
cāra, and to propose a reconstruction of their original Sanskrit forms. 
Further, the controversy between the three opinions about this term will 
also be discussed. It is hoped that this study will shed some light on the 
above-mentioned issue as it was discussed in the Buddhist epistemologi-
cal tradition.  
2   kaidao = avakāśadāna 
2.1 In CWSL, although three different interpretations of the function and 
the nature of this kaidaoyi are introduced, the exact meaning of this term 
is not explicitly explained. Kuiji (窺基, 632–692), who is traditionally re-
garded as the most authoritative interpreter of Xuanzang, offers us quite 
a comprehensive explanation of the term kaidaoyi in his commentary on 
CWSL, Cheng weishi lun shuji (成唯識論述記, hereafter CWSL-SJ), where 
he explains the sentence on the third basis, *samanantarapratyayāśraya, 
in CWSL. Let us begin with his explanation, which reads as follows: 
Now, the word kai means that [the preceding awareness] leaves its 
place, i.e., makes way for the [subsequent awareness]. Again, the word 
dao means that [the former] leads [the latter] to arise; [that is to say,] 
leads and causes [the latter] to be born in its place.  
Thus, in Sanskrit [kaidao] is said jielanduo (羯爛多, *krānta). Here 
[in China], this can be rendered as cidiyuan (次第緣, krāntapratyaya?2). 
-------------------------------------------------- 
2  Kuiji seems first to confuse krānta with krama, which is usually translated as cidi (次第), 
and then to confuse cidi with the same characters in the compound cidiyuan (次第緣), 
another standard translation of samanantarapratyaya used in Paramārtha’s (真諦, 499-
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For example, “in reverse order” is said *anukrānta; anu means “re-
verse”, *krānta means “in order”; “in due order” (順次第: 須次第) is 
said *pratikrānta; prati means “due”.3 When the condition is referred 
to as samanantara, it refers to dengwujianyuan (等無間緣), “similar-im-
mediate condition”, because sam- means “similar”, a- means “un-”, 
antara means “mediate”.4 
2.2 The first part of this passage is just a literal explanation of the two 
Chinese characters (kai-dao) in the first element of the term. In the sec-
ond part of this passage, interestingly, a phonetic transcription of the 
Sanskrit form of the term is provided. In this regard, two points should 
be clarified.  
First, based on Kuiji’s phonetic transcription of the Sanskrit form, 
jielanduo,5 given in this explanation, La Vallée Poussin suggests that the 
term kaidaoyi can be reconstructed in Sanskrit as *krānta (cf. La Vallée 
Poussin, 1928: 228, n. 2). This is of course correct, and I also follow this 
reconstruction. However, this Sanskrit term, used in this sense, is not to 
my knowledge attested in any Indian sources, and Kuiji’s phonetic tran-
scription is dubious.  
Second, two terms appear here: *krāntapratyaya (according to Kuiji!) 
and samanantarapratyaya; in this passage, Kuiji seems not to care about 
-------------------------------------------------- 
569) translations of AKBh (AKBh P), corresponding to dengwujianyuan (等無間緣) in 
Xuanzang’s translation (AKBh X).  
3 It is possible that this reversed placement of the characters ni (逆) and shun (順) is a 
result of miscopying during the process of textual transmission. My thanks to Dr. Hong 
Luo, who reminded me of this possibility. 




5 It is almost needless to mention that the initial sound j- is to be pronounced in Middle 
Chinese as k-. The pronunciation of the character jie (羯) in Middle Chinese is recon-
structed in Pulleyblank, 1991: 154 as *kiat, etc. Cf. also the remark in ibid.: 19: “The 
graph 迦, now pronounced jiā, is found almost exclusively in Buddhist transcriptions, 
where it represents the Indian (Sanskrit or Prakrit) syllables ka or kā. In the Guangyun, it 
has the reading E. *kia, which according to the expected regular development ought to 
give Mandarin jiē.”  
274 Chu  
 
the difference between yi=āśraya (依) and yuan=pratyaya (緣), but rather, 
tries to differentiate *krānta- from samanantara-. He emphasizes that here 
kaidaoyi (*krāntāśraya) can be understood as *krāntapratyaya, while sam-
anantara- refers to the “similar-immediate condition”. That is to say, ac-
cording to him, it is not correct to use the term kaidaoyi (*krāntāśraya) or 
*krāntapratyaya (次第緣) to refer to samanantarapratyaya, “similar-imme-
diate condition”. Although the form cidiyuan (次第緣) is also well attest-
ed as a Chinese translation of samanantarapratyaya in texts of both the 
Abhidharma and the Yogācāra, according to Kuiji this Chinese phrase 
can only be used as the translation of *krāntapratyaya. The sub-commen-
tary authored by Ruli (如理, whose dates are unknown), in explaining 
this sentence in Kuiji (羯爛多至是間義故者), also says that, here, Kuiji’s 
intention is to point out the mistake of the “old tradition” in calling the 
similar-immediate condition cidiyuan; thus, the Sanskrit term is intro-
duced as a comparison, for the purpose of differentiating what is correct 
from what is wrong.6 This assertion that *krāntapratyaya should be sepa-
rated from samanantarapratyaya also seems implausible to me. 
2.3 Indeed, the words kaidao, “making way and leading to arise”, in the 
term kaidaoyi, express a very common idea, which had already taken root 
in the old Abhidharma tradition, where the similar-immediate condition 
is often described as performing the function of “giving way” or “leading 
to arise” in respect to thought and thought concomitants in the subse-
quent moment. According to a principle widely accepted by Buddhist 
philosophical systems from the Sarvāstivāda down to the Yogācāra, the 
awareness that passed away in the antecedent moment is called “mind” 
(manas). This principle is based on the idea that the five types of sensory 
awareness have two kinds of “basis”, namely, the material sense faculties 
and the mental faculty. This is explained in AKBh as follows:  
Of these [six awareness-elements] (ṣaḍvijñānadhātu)], the visual sense 
is the co-nascent basis of the visual awareness, and so on, up to the 
tactile sense [which is the co-nascent basis] of the tactile awareness. 
In addition, for these [five types of sensory awareness], mind also 
-------------------------------------------------- 
6 Cf. CWSL-SYY 591b19: 羯爛多至是間義故者，此文來意者謂舊喚等無間緣為次第緣謬
也。今謂辨其邪正故引梵本對明. 
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[constitutes] a past basis. Thus, these five groups of [sensory] aware-
ness have two faculties as their bases.7 
This idea can be traced back to the scriptural tradition – the widely quot-
ed scriptural statement: “Bhikṣus! Visible matter is grasped by means of 
two [things], i.e., by visual awareness and by mind (manas) which is 
brought into use (ākṛṣṭa) by that [visual awareness].”8 Here, “visual 
awareness” refers to the present awareness, and “mind” refers to the 
previous awareness.  
2.4 The statements of this principle can be found in various Abhidharma 
treatises. PVVibh already speaks of the five sensory awarenesses as each 
having two kinds of “basis”, the one arising simultaneously, i.e., the five 
sense faculties such as visual sense, and the other ceasing in the immed-
iate antecedent moment, i.e., the mental sense.9 In AMV there is a more 
detailed discussion. There, a question is asked: “Why is it only said that 
the thought series (cittasaṃtati) of the living being in the sensual realm 
(kāmadhātu) and the form realm (rūpadhātu) takes a body as its basis 
(āśraya), although it also takes [conditioning forces dissociated from 
thought] such as the vital faculty (jīvitendriya) and group-commonality 
-------------------------------------------------- 
7 AKBh 34.9-10 (ad AK 1.44d): tatra cakṣurvijñānasya cakṣuḥ sahaja āśrayo yāvat kāyavijñānas-
ya kāyaḥ. atītaḥ punar eṣām āśrayo mana ity apy ete pañca vijñānakāyā indriyadvayāśrayāḥ. Cf. 
the similar idea stated in AMV 137b9: 若生欲界。眼識現在前。此識以眼及無間滅意
為依及所依… 
8 Quoted in DhPr 62.21 (=NBṬṬ 26.10=TBh 15.17-18 with slight deviation): dvābhyāṃ 
bhikṣavo rūpaṃ gṛhyate, cakṣurvijñānena tadākṛṣṭena ca manaseti. In this sentence, the 
word ā-√kṛṣ means literally “to draw towards oneself”, but here it must mean “to bring 
into use”, “to make something active” or “to realize the function of a thing”. In NBṬṬ, 
the word manas is replaced with manovijñāna; the meaning then becomes completely 
different. In that case, the cakṣurvijñāna is the past awareness and the manovijñāna the 
present awareness, and the word ā-√kṛṣ means “to cause something to arise”, “bring 
something into being”. However, this change seems to me to be the result of the influ-
ence of Dharmakīrti’s theory that mental awareness is caused by visual awareness as 
the similar-immediate condition. 
9 Cf. PVVibh 991b14-15: 或復五識各二所依。一俱時生。謂眼等五。二無間滅。謂即意
根. 
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(nikāyasabhāga) as its basis (niśritya)?”10 In answering this question, one 
explanation is noted as follows: For living beings in these two realms, the 
present (pratyupasthita) sensory awarenesses, such as visual awareness, 
take both sense faculties, i.e., the visual sense and the mind that ceased 
in the immediately antecedent moment (anantaranirodhamanas), as the 
basis (with the exception that there is no olfactory awareness and gusta-
tory awareness in the form realm); and in the formless realm (ārūpya-
dhātu), the present mental awareness takes the mind that has ceased in 
the immediately antecedent moment as its basis.11  
A clear and straightforward expression of this principle can be found 
in Vasubandhu’s AK 1.17ab: “In fact, [the element of] mind is any of the 
six [groups of] awareness that has passed away in the immediately ante-
cedent moment.”12 Vasubandhu further explains the relativity of the 
awareness that passed away in the immediately antecedent moment to 
the present awareness, saying that just like a person who is himself a son, 
but is also the father of another person, the awareness that itself is a 
fruit is also the seed of another fruit.13 And Saṅghabhadra also explains 
the same idea. In answering the question of why the awareness that has 
ceased to exist is called the basis of the present awareness, he says that 
this is because this ceased awareness is the immediate condition (linjin-
yuan 鄰近緣) for the present awareness to arise; just as visual awareness, 
even though it has visible matter [as its condition qua object-support 
(ālambanapratyaya)], needs the visual sense as its basis for arising, in the 
-------------------------------------------------- 
10 AMV 137b2-3: 問欲色二界心相續轉亦依命根眾同分等。此中何故但說依身; cf. 
AKBh 112.11-13: nikāyasabhāgaṃ jīvitendriyaṃ ca niśrityety ābhidhārmikāḥ. rūpiṇām api 
tarhi sattvānāṃ kim arthaṃ na tad eva dvayaṃ niśritya pravarttate cittasantatiḥ. In AKBh 
62.11-15 (ad AK 2.35-36a) fourteen conditioning forces dissociated from thought are 
mentioned; cf. Cox, 1995: 182, n. 1, Dhammajoti, 2009: 292-293. 




12 AKBh 11.22 (AK 1.17ab): ṣaṇṇām anantarātītaṃ vijñānaṃ yad dhi tan manaḥ.  
13 AKBh 11.23-24): yad yat samanantaraniruddhaṃ vijñānaṃ tan manodhātur ity ucyate ([Eji-
ma ed.: 18.2]: ucyeta). tadyathā sa eva putro ’nyasya pitā bhavati, tad eva phalam anyasya 
bījam iti. 
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same way, the awareness in the subsequent moment needs the mind that 
ceased to exist in the immediately antecedent moment as its basis for 
arising; therefore, the phrase “the mind that ceased to exist in the imme-
diately antecedent moment” (read 前念無間滅意 for 前言無間滅意) 
serves the purpose of excluding the thought interrupted in the antece-
dent moment. Although [this mind] gives way [in order for the subse-
quent awareness to arise] (read 開避 for 聞避), it does not directly 
produce the subsequent awareness; for this reason, the six awarenesses 
that ceased to exist in the immediately antecedent moment provide the 
basis for the present awareness and are called the “element of mind” 
(manodhātu).14 
2.5 This principle is also clearly stated in the Yogācārabhūmi as follows:  
Then what is the similar-immediate condition? Those factors of 
thought and thought concomitants (cittacaittā dharmāḥ) from which 
[other] factors of thought and thought concomitants arise are called 
“the similar-immediate condition” of the latter. Thus, those six 
awarenesses which are the similar-immediate condition of the [other] 
six awarenesses are mind, designated as “mind” (manas) [i.e. the men-
tal faculty (manaindriya)], “mental sphere” (manaāyatana) and “mental 
element” (manodhātu).15  
A similar statement can also be found in a passage of MS, where Asaṅga 
explains two aspects of the meaning of “mind” (manas): (1) the term re-
fers to the “mind” (manas) or thinking faculty in accordance with the 
theory shared generally also by the Sarvāstivāda and the Sautrāntika, 
-------------------------------------------------- 
14 Cf. NA 342b21-25: 如何已滅名現識依。是現識生鄰近緣故。如雖有色而要依眼眼識
得生。如是雖有所緣境界。而後識生。要依前念無間滅意。是故前言無間滅者。為
遮前念有間滅心。雖先聞避而未生故。由此無間。已滅六識。為現識依。說為意界. 
15 YBh (T) Zhi 16a2-3: de la mtshungs pa de ma thag pa’i rkyen gang zhe na | sems dang sems las 
byung ba’i chos gang dag gi mjug thogs su sems dang sems las byung ba’i chos gang dag ’byung 
ba de dag ni | de dag gi mtshungs pa de ma thag pa’i rkyen zhes bya’o || de la rnam par shes pa 
drug po gang dag yin pa de dag ni rnam par shes pa drug po de dag mtshungs pa de ma thag 
pa’i rkyen yin te | de dag ni yid la yid ces bya ba dang | yid kyi skye mched ces bya ba dang | yid 
kyi khams zhes bya bar yang gdags so; =YBh (C) 584b28–c2: 復次云何等無間緣。謂此諸
心心所無間。彼諸心心所生。說此為彼等無間緣。若此六識為彼六識等無間緣。即
施設此名為意根。亦名意處亦名意界. 
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which holds that thought (citta), mind (manas) and awareness (vijñāna) 
have the same meaning (paryāyā); and (2) it also refers to the defiled 
mind (kliṣṭamanas), in accordance with the theory unique to the Yogā-
cāra. Asaṅga says with regard to the first aspect: “Because it comprises 
the basis (āśrayībhūta) by virtue of performing the function of the imme-
diate condition, the awareness that ceased to exist in the immediately 
antecedent moment (anantaraniruddha), named ‘mind’ (manas), is the ba-
sis for the arising of awareness.”16 
-------------------------------------------------- 
16 MS 5.10-13: de ma thag pa’i rkyen byed pas | gnas su gyur pa’i phyir | rnam par shes pa ’gags 
ma thag pa yid ces bya ba rnam par shes pa skye ba’i gnas dang... Cf. also YBh (ed.) 11.6-7: 
manaḥ katamat. yat ṣaṇṇām api vijñānakāyānām anantaraniruddhaṃ... Xuanzang’s trans-
lation of this passage is worth discussing briefly. According to the Tibetan translation, 
it is only stated here that the awareness in the immediately antecedent moment is the 
similar-immediate condition for “awareness”, that is, any kind of awareness. However, 
in Xuanzang’s translation, this “awareness” is specified as “mental awareness” (yishi 
意識, manovijñāña, cf. MS (X) 133c6-7: 第一與作等無間緣所依止性。無間滅識能與意
識作生依止); but Paramārtha’s translation is similar to the Tibetan (MS (P) 158a21-22: 
一能與彼生次第緣依故。先滅識為意。又以識生依止為意). Based on the Tibetan 
translation, the last part of this sentence can be reconstructed as something like *an-
antaraniruddhaṃ vijñānaṃ mano nāma vijñānasyotpādāśrayaḥ; probably Xuanzang had a 
text something like …*manovijñānasyotpādāśrayaḥ, that is to say, manas is not construed 
with the first part of this sentence. This interpretation is also followed by Lamotte in 
his translation (cf. Lamotte, 1973: 16: “…est le support de naissance [utpattyāśraya] de 
la connaissance mental [manovijñāna]”). Nagao does not accept this interpretation, and 
maintains that manas provides the basis for the arising of all of the first six kinds of 
awareness (Nagao, 1982: 92, n. 2; 93-94, n. 4). Xuanzang’s translation is probably 
influenced by Vasubandhu’s interpretation. In MSBh Vasubandhu explains this 
sentence as follows: “Of these [different meanings of “mind”], because of the fact that 
it performs the function of the similar-immediate condition, the awareness that 
already ceased to exist in the immediately antecedent moment comprises the cause of 
the mental awareness [in the subsequent moment]; this is one [meaning] of ‘mind’;” 
MSBh 150b1-2: de la mtshungs pa de ma thag pa’i rkyen byed pa nyid gyi phyir rnam par shes 
pa gang de ma thag par ’gags pa nyid ni yid kyi rnam par shes pa’i rgyu ’gyur bas de ni yid gcig 
go (cf. also Xuanzang’s own translation of this sentence in MSBh (X) 325b15: 謂無間滅
識與意識為因是第一意). However, Paramārtha’s translation of MSBh is different 
from that of Xuanzang; the second part of this sentence is translated by Paramārtha 
as: “Again, the mind is the basis for the awareness that is currently arising” (MSBh (P) 
158a24: 復有意能作正生識依止). Ui Hakuju (宇井伯壽) interpreted this “awareness 
that is currently arising” as referring to ālayavijñāna, but as is pointed out in Nagao, 
1982: 93, n. 2, this is not correct. Nagao interpreted it as referring to “the six aware-
nesses that are arising”. However, the reading 正生識依止 = *vijñānasyotpadyamāna-
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2.6 Already in the Sarvāstivāda tradition, the similar-immediate condi-
tion had been linked with the function of “giving way”. For example, in 
AMV it is said that the similar-immediate condition is like the [prece-
ding] factor (dharma) that gives way [to the subsequent factor].17 Saṅ-
ghabhadra also mentions this idea. However, based on the Sarvāstivāda/
Vaibhāṣika’s theory that a factor is present when it exercises its activity 
(kāritra) (cf. Dhammajoti, 2009: 126ff), he emphasizes that only a present 
factor can perform the function of giving way. Needless to say, this pre-
sent factor is a past factor by the time the result it brings about is active. 
Saṅghabhadra says: 
It is called “similar-immediate condition” on account of its power of 
giving way. It is not the case that [something] in the state of just 
arising (*utpadyamānāvasthā) has the capacity of giving way; it has the 
power of giving way only when it has been already produced; and 
when it is already in the state of having ceased to exist, it is said to 
have already performed the function of giving way.18 
The same idea is also stated in AK(Bh) 2.63, starting with the question: In 
respect to a factor in what temporal state (kimavastha) do these [four] 
conditions (pratyayāḥ)19 perform their activity (kāritra)?20 Different tem-
-------------------------------------------------- 
syāśrayaḥ seems to me implausible; probably it is just a misreading of *vijñānasyotpādā-
śrayaḥ. For the time being, since no Sanskrit text is available, a satisfactory explana-
tion of the disagreement of these translations cannot be offered. I wonder if it is pos-
sible that Paramārtha omitted the word manas in his translation of the MSBh in order 
to make it concordant with the mūla-text of MS. If Vasubandhu’s text really read mano-
vijñāna, then a question may be asked: Is it a special theory which holds that the 
awareness in the antecedent moment provides the similar-immediate condition for 
the arising of mental awareness only? 
17 AMV 109a26: 等無間緣如開導法. Cf. also ibid. 284a19, 285b6: 等無間緣如開避法. 
18 ANA 422c29-23a2: 等無間緣。據開避力。非正生位。有開避能。要已生時。有開避
力。若至已滅。名已開避. 
19 I.e., “condition qua cause” (hetupratyaya), “similar-immediate condition” (samanantara-
pratyaya), “condition qua object-support” (ālambanapratyaya) and “dominant condition” 
(adhipatipratyaya). For a discussion of the doctrine of these four conditions, cf. Dham-
majoti, 2009: 169-175. 
20 AKBh 100.19: atha saite pratyayāḥ kāritraṃ kurvantaḥ kimavasthe dharme kurvanti. 
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poral relationships between the conditions and the conditioned factors 
are discussed. It is said that of the five types of condition qua cause 
(hetupratyaya),21 the co-existent cause and the associated cause perform 
their activities in respect to factors that are “ceasing to exist”, i.e., the 
“present” factors, while the homogeneous cause, omnipresent cause and 
maturation cause perform their activities on the factors that are “aris-
ing”, i.e., the “future” factors.22 The text then turns to discuss the other 
three conditions. It is said that the similar-immediate condition per-
forms its activity in respect to factors that are arising, i.e., future factors; 
the condition of object-support performs its activity in respect to factors 
that are ceasing to exist, i.e., present factors; further, the dominant con-
dition performs its activity in respect to factors in all temporal states. In-
terestingly, in talking about the similar-immediate condition, it is ex-
plained why this condition performs its activity in respect to “arising” or 
“future” factors: “because it gives way [to the factors in respect to which 
it performs its activity]” (avakāśadānāt).23 These factors refer to thought 
and thought concomitants caused by this condition.  
2.7 In the Bodhisattvabhūmi section of YBh this idea is described as fol-
lows: 
-------------------------------------------------- 
21 I.e., five of the six “causes” treated in AK(Bh) 2.49-55ab, with the exception of the 
“efficient cause” (kāraṇahetu), namely: “co-existent cause” (sahabhūhetu), “homogene-
ous cause” (sabhāgahetu), “associated cause” (saṃprayuktakahetu), “universal cause” 
(sarvatragahetu) and “retributive cause” (vipākahetu). For a discussion of the definition 
of these six causes, cf. Dhammajoti, 2009: 149-156. 
22 Cf. AK(Bh) 100.19-25 (AK 2.63a-c): hetupratyayas tāvat pañcavidha uktaḥ. tatra nirudhya-
māne kāritraṃ, dvau hetū kurutaḥ || nirudhyamānaṃ nāma varttamānam. nirodhābhimukha-
tvāt. tatra sahabhūsaṃprayuktakahetū kāritraṃ kurutaḥ. sahotpanne ’pi phale tayor vyāpāraḥ. 
trayaḥ jāyamāne || jāyamānaṃ nāmānāgatam utpādābhimukham. tatra sabhāgasarvatragavi-
pākahetavaḥ kāritraṃ kurvanti. evaṃ tāvad dhetupratyayaḥ. 
23 AKBh 101.3-5: samanantarapratyayālambanapratyayau veditavyau. samanantarapratyayo 
jāyamāne kāritraṃ karoty avakāśadānāt. ālambanapratyayo nirudhyamāne, varttamānaiś cit-
tacaittair grahaṇāt. adhipatipratyayas tu sarvasyām avasthāyām anāvaraṇabhāvenāvasthita 
ity etad evāsya kāritram. uktāḥ sakāritrāḥ pratyayāḥ. In this passage, the phrase avakāśa-
dāna is translated by Xuanzang yu qi chu (與其處, AKBh X 37c3), but it is explained in 
Yuanhui’s (圓暉, 8th c., exact dates unknown) commentary as kaipilu (開避路): “It 
gives way, because it makes way immediately upon the arising of the resulting factor” 
(JSLS-Slb 859b4: 以等無間。果法生時。開避路故。與其處也). 
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Only the factors of thought and thought concomitants have both a 
similar-immediate condition and a condition qua object-support.24 To 
wit: the factors of thought and thought concomitants, being support-
ed (parigṛhīta)25 by [thought and thought concomitants] born previ-
-------------------------------------------------- 
24 This statement can be compared with AK 2.34bcd quoted below at the end of n. 42. 
25 Here the word parigṛhīta or parigraha, used also below in the compound parigrahahetu, 
has a special meaning, different from its normal use in the sense of “taking possession” 
as in the compound ātmabhāvaparigraha (the meaning and use of this compound is dis-
cussed at length in Schmithausen, 1987: 552-566). Parigrahahetu, as the fourth or fifth 
cause of the ten causes (daśa hetavaḥ), is explained elsewhere in YBh in the context of 
discussion of the ten causes along with four conditions (catvāraḥ pratyayāḥ) and five 
fruits (pañca phalāni). It seems to me that, in this context, this term is used to encom-
pass all secondary causes, apart from the main cause that is usually referred to as the 
“generative cause” (nirvṛttihetu) or “seed” (bīja). In the BBh, seed (bīja), which should 
be understood as condition qua cause (hetupratyaya), is regarded as the projecting 
cause (ākṣepahetu) or the generative cause (nirvṛttihetu), while parigrahahetu refers to 
other conditions that are separate from “seeds” (cf. BBh 97.24-26: tatra bījam āvasāni-
kasya svaphalasyākṣepahetuḥ. bījanirmuktaḥ tadanyaḥ pratyayaḥ parigrahahetuḥ. tad eva bī-
jaṃ svaphalasaya nirvṛttihetuḥ). Furthermore, parigrahahetu is explained in another pas-
sage as “conditions in the manner that earth and rain [are conditions] for the appear-
ance of a sprout” (BBh 99.22-23: pṛthivīvṛṣṭyādikaḥ pratyayo ’ṅkuraprādurbhavāya parigra-
hahetuḥ). In the Maulī bhūmi section it is said: “Of them, that which produces is the ge-
nerative cause. The remainder are causes of means. Any (ekatya) parigrahahetu is a co-
existent cause. Just as the visual sense is [the parigrahahetu] of the visual awareness, in 
the same way also the auditory sense, etc., [are the parigrahahetu] of the other aware-
nesses [respectively]” (YBh (ed) 111.9-11: tatra janako abhinirvṛttihetuḥ. avaśiṣṭā upā-
yahetavaḥ. sahabhūtāḥ [em: sahabhūhetuḥ, Tib.: lhan cig ’byung ba’i rgru] tad yathā ekatyaḥ 
parigrahahetuḥ. tad yathā cakṣuś cakṣurvijñānasya, evaṃ śrotrādayas tadanyeṣāṃ vijñānā-
nām). In another passage of this section parigrahahetu is explained in more detail, and 
it is connected with “the basis of cause that passed away contiguously” (śliṣṭanirodhaṃ 
hetvadhiṣṭhānam), and “the basis of cause which is the object-field, sense faculty, action, 
human effort, and view of reality” (cf. YBh (ed) 108.12-20: tatra śliṣṭanirodhaṃ hetvadhi-
ṣṭhānam adhiṣṭhāya tathā viṣayam indriyaṃ kriyāṃ puruṣakāraṃ tattvadarśanaṃ ca hetva-
dhiṣṭhānam adhiṣṭhāya parigrahahetuḥ prajñāpyate. tat kasya hetoḥ. tathā hi. kāmapratisaṃ-
yukteṣu dharmeṣu samanantaranirodhaparigṛhītā saṃskārāṇāṃ pravṛttir bhavati. viṣayapari-
gṛhītendriyaparigṛhītā kriyāparigṛhītā puruṣakāraparigṛhītā ca. yathā kāmapratisaṃyuktā-
nām evaṃ rūpapratisaṃyuktānām ārūpyapratisaṃyuktānāṃ. tattvadarśanaparigṛhītā vā pu-
nas tadanyeṣām apratisaṃyuktānāṃ dharmāṇāṃ pravṛttir bhavati. tasmāc chliṣṭanirodhaṃ 
viṣayam indriyaṃ kriyāṃ puruṣakāraṃ tattvadarśanaṃ cādhiṣṭhāya parigrahahetuḥ prajñā-
pyate); cf. also La Vallée Poussin, 1928: 457ff., where he translated the passage talking 
about the ten causes, among which parigrahahetu is translated “cause adjuvante”.  
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ously which give way to (avakāśadāna) [their successors] and [also 
being] supported by the object-support, become manifest and come 
forth. For this reason, the similar-immediate condition and the condi-
tion qua object-support are to be known as included in the supporting 
cause (parigrahahetu).26 
In this passage, the phrase avakāśadāna is translated in the Chinese ver-
sion as kaidao (開導), the same characters that comprise the first part of 
the term kaidaoyi; and as we have seen above (§2.1 and n. 5), the idea of 
“making room” or “giving way” is also employed by Kuiji when explain-
ing the meaning of this term. 
3   kaidaoyi = *avakāśadānāśraya27 
3.1 With regard to the causes of the arising of thought and thought 
concomitants, in the Yogācāra system, another set of terms, with “basis” 
(°āśraya) at end of the compound, is introduced, although the old terms 
of the Abhidharma system with “condition” (°pratyaya) at the end are 
also still in use. Under this circumstance, we need to explain why “basis” 
is preferred instead of “condition”. The reason is probably that, accord-
ing to the Yogācāra, awareness needs a basis (āśraya) or substratum 
(adhiṣṭhāna) to perform the function of a condition, and the notion of 
“basis” is also somewhat related to the gradual development of the idea 
of the substratum awareness (ālayavijñāna) which is finally regarded as 
the basis of personal existence.28 As we have mentioned above, in CWSL, 
-------------------------------------------------- 
26 BBh 99.3-8: samanantarapratyayaś cālaṃbanapratyayaś ca cittacaitasikānām eva dhar-
māṇāṃ. tathā hi cittacaitasikā dharmāḥ prāgutpannāvakāśadānaparigṛhītā ālaṃbanaparigṛ-
hītāś ca prādurbhavanti pravartante ca. tasmāt samanantarapratyaya ālaṃbanapratyayaś ca 
parigrahahetunā saṃgṛhītau veditavyau. = YBh (C) 501.15-17: 等無間緣及所緣緣。唯望
一切心心法說。由彼一切心及心法前生開導所攝受故。所緣境界所攝受故。方生方
轉。是故當知等無間緣及所緣緣。攝受因攝. 
27 The word *avakāśadānāśraya could be two separate words: avakāśadāna āśrayaḥ, as in 
the case of samanantara āśrayaḥ (cf. n. 32 below). For convenience I use only the 
compound form throughout this paper. This also holds for *krāntāśraya. 
28 Cf. Schmithausen, 1987: I:51: “Therefore, it would seem that in the Pravṛtti Portion 
(referring to the first half of the second part of Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī, see ibid. 299, n. 
226 - Chu) ālayavijñāna has, at least de facto, transcended its original feature of essen-
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in the context of explaining the basis (āśraya) of the seventh awareness, 
i.e. the defiled mind, a general discussion of the basis of thought and 
thought concomitants (cittacaitta) is provided, and there the word “basis” 
(āśraya) is added to a term ending with “condition” (pratyaya). It is said 
there that all thought and thought concomitants have their basis, and 
three kinds of basis are mentioned: (1) *hetupratyayāśraya, or “basis of 
condition qua cause”, which refers to each individual seed (svabīja) of 
conditioned factors (saṃskṛta), because the latter arise on this basis and 
do not arise without their condition qua causes; (2) *adhipatipratyayāśraya, 
or “basis of dominant condition”, which refers to the six internal cogni-
tive spheres (ādhyātmikaṃ ṣaḍāyatanaṃ, i.e., five material sense faculties 
and one mental sense faculty), because all thought and thought conco-
mitants arise on this basis and do not arise without the co-existent 
(sahabhū) sense faculties; and (3) *samanantarapratyayāśraya, or “basis of 
similar-immediate condition”, which refers to the mind that ceased to 
exist in the previous moment (pūrvaniruddhamanas), 29  because all 
thought and thought concomitants arise on this basis and do not arise 
-------------------------------------------------- 
tially being bound, and somehow subordinate, to corporeal matter, and has rather in 
its turn become a fundamental constituent of personality, on a par with corporeal 
matter and eventually even superseding the latter in its function of basis[-of-personal-
existence] (āśraya).”  
29 According to Kuiji, the element samanantarapratyaya in the compound samanantara-
pratyaya-āśraya is indispensable, because by using the term, one can specifically refer 
to the awareness (i.e., citta, the principal thought) that passed away in the immedi-
ately antecedent moment, and both the seed that ceased to exist in the previous 
moment and thought concomitants (caitta) can be excluded. Cf. CWSL-SJ 379.22-25: 若
言無間依即前滅種子望後種子應是此依。簡異彼故言等無間緣依。若爾前念心所應
是此依。是此緣故。不爾心所非是所依。言等無間復是所依故復雙簡也; “If it were 
called the ‘immediate basis (anantara-āśraya)’, the seed that ceased to exist in the 
previous moment could be this kind of basis in respect to the seed in the subsequent 
moment. In order to exclude this possibility, it is called the ‘basis of similar-immediate 
condition’. [Objection:] In this case, thought concomitants (caitta) should also be this 
kind of basis. [Reply:] That is not correct, because the thought concomitants cannot 
function as a basis [because only the principal thought (citta) can perform this func-
tion]. It is called ‘similar-immediate’, also, because [the awareness that passed away in 
the immediately antecedent moment, called ‘mind’] can be the basis [and the thought 
concomitants are excluded]. [Thus, by this term], a double exclusion is effected.”  
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without this past mental faculty which performs the function of kaidao, 
“making way and leading to arise” (kaidaogen 開導根).30 
3.2 From the perspective of the structure of the text, this discussion in 
CWSL seems to be an unnatural insertion – independent of the main con-
text of discussing the basis of the defiled mind; and indeed, it is just an 
adapted version of the idea stated in YBh. Actually, in YBh, the relation-
ship between “basis” (here, adhiṣṭhāna, “substratum” is used instead of ā-
śraya) and “condition” is explained as follows. 
Further, based on the seed as the substratum qua condition (pratyayā-
dhiṣṭhāna), the “condition qua cause” is designated; based on [the fac-
tor that has] passed away immediately (śliṣṭanirodha) as the substra-
tum qua condition, the “similar-immediate condition” is designated; 
based on the object as the substratum qua condition, the “condition of 
object-support” is designated; based on the substratum qua condition 
other than these [i.e., sense faculties], the “dominant condition” is 
designated.31 
“Substratum qua condition” refers surely to the substratum (adhiṣṭhāna) 
based on which the conditions perform their function; probably it im-
-------------------------------------------------- 
30 Cf. CWSL 19b22-27: 諸心心所皆有所依。然彼所依總有三種。一因緣依。謂自種子。
諸有為法皆託此依。離自因緣必不生故。二增上緣依。謂內六處。諸心心所皆託此
依。離俱有根必不轉故。三等無間緣依。謂前滅意。諸心心所皆託此依。離開導根
必不起故; cf. La Vallée Poussin, 1928: 227ff. In his commentary, while explaining the 
“basis” of the eight awarenesses, Yuance (圓測, Wŏnch’uk) mentions also three kinds 
of basis equivalent to those three in CWSL, but he uses the term *sahabhūr āśraya for 
*adhipatipratyayāśraya, and kaidaoyi for *samanantarapratyayāśraya. He explains the 
term kaidaoyi as follows: “The second is the basis that gives way to [the subsequent 
awareness] (*avakāśadānāśraya). This means that each of the eight groups of awareness 
that ceased to exist in the immediately antecedent moment is the basis that gives way 
to [the awareness] in the subsequent moment. For this reason it is said in [Xuanzang’s] 
Vijñaptimātratā[siddhi]...” Cf. JSMJS 241b5-10: 八識所依。各有三種。一因緣依...二開
導依。謂前念滅自類八識。各望後念。為開導依。故唯識云。三等無間緣依。謂前
滅意諸心心所。皆託此依。離開導根。必不轉故。三俱有依... 
31 YBh (ed.) 110.18-21: tatra bījaṃ pratyayādhiṣṭhānam adhiṣṭhāya hetupratyayaḥ prajñāpyate. 
śliṣṭanirodhaṃ pratyayādhiṣṭhānam adhiṣṭhāya samanantarapratyayaḥ prajñāpyate. viṣayaṃ 
pratyayādhiṣṭhānam adhiṣṭhāya ālambanapratyayaḥ prajñāpyate. tadanyāni pratyayādhi-
ṣṭhānāny adhiṣṭhāya adhipatipratyayaḥ prajñāpyate. 
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plies here the idea which is expressed later with the term ālayavijñāna, 
the substratum from which the various psycho-physical factors arise. 
3.3 In the standard Yogācāra texts, these three bases are usually men-
tioned as bījāśraya (“basis in the sense of seed”), sahabhūr āśrayaḥ 
(“co-existent basis”) and samanantara āśrayaḥ (“similar-immediate basis”) 
respectively. In fact, these three bases are already mentioned in the 
Maulī bhūmi of the YBh, where it is said that for visual awareness, the 
visual sense is the co-existent basis, and mind is the similar-immediate 
basis, while the substratum awareness (ālayavijñāna), qualified as “con-
taining all seeds”, “appropriating the basis of personal existence” and 
“comprised in the category of maturation”, is the basis in the sense of 
seed.32 The “mind” is further described as “the awareness [i.e. any one of 
the six kinds of awareness] that passes away immediately before the vi-
sual awareness [arises]”.33 It seems to be quite possible that, in the dis-
cussion of CWSL mentioned above, in the context of discussing the “basis” 
of the arising of thought and thought concomitants, the theoretical 
model of “four conditions” that was available in the traditional Abhi-
dharma system was replaced with the new model of “three bases”. Of the 
four Abhidharma conditions, the Yogācāra texts fail to take up only the 
“condition qua object-support” (ālambanapratyaya), for the reason that 
this condition, which the realistic systems maintained was eternally 
existent, does not serve the purposes of an idealistic analysis of the aris-
ing of thought and thought concomitants.34 The traditional term hetu-
pratyaya is now newly defined as the “basis in the sense of seed” (bījā-
śraya), referring the new element ālayavijñāna; while the other two ele-
ments, adhipatipratyaya and samanantarapratyaya, are described as saha-
bhūr āśrayaḥ, “co-existent basis”, and samanantara āśrayaḥ, “similar-im-
mediate basis” respectively. In the case of these last two bases, notably, 
-------------------------------------------------- 
32 Cf. YBh (ed.) 4.6-7: cakṣurvijñānasya āśrayaḥ katamaḥ. cakṣuḥ sahabhūr āśrayaḥ, manaḥ 
samanantara āśrayaḥ, sarvabījakam āśrayopādātṛ vipākasaṃgṛhītam ālayavijñānaṃ bījāśra-
yaḥ. This passage is also quoted and analyzed in the context of discussion of the occur-
rence of ālayavijñāna in Schmithausen, 1987: 110ff. 
33 Cf. ibid. 4.11-12: manaḥ katamat. yac cakṣurvijñānasyānantarātītaṃ vijñānaṃ. 
34 As is well-known, in Dignāga’s ĀP all possibilities for the existence of an external 
“condition qua object-support” are negated. 
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only the temporal aspect is taken into consideration, i.e., the fivefold 
material sense faculty is regarded as the present basis and the mental 
faculty (“mind”) as the past basis. Also worth mentioning is that the tra-
ditional samanantarapratyaya is now referred to as āśraya; however, the 
function it performs is still the same, viz. avakāśadāna, “giving way”.  
3.4 Thus far, we can conclude that kaidaoyi refers to a preceding aware-
ness that has ceased to exist, which is called “mind” (manas);35 this mind 
“gives way” in order for the subsequent awareness to arise. It is also 
worthwhile to note that the idea that the awareness that had passed 
away in the previous moment is called “mind” with the function of giv-
ing way to the subsequent awareness, although it is well accepted in 
Yogācāra texts, is in fact an old traditional interpretation of the similar-
immediate condition in the Abhidharma tradition. Indeed, this generally 
accepted idea is now expressed by the term *avakāśadānāśraya in the 
commentarial materials on Vasubandhu’s TrK passed down to Xuanzang. 
For this reason, it seems to me that we should probably put aside Kuiji’s 
rendering of kaidaoyi with jielanduo or *krānta, and take the Sanskrit 
word *avakāśadānāśraya, “basis that gives way to [the subsequent aware-
ness]”, or more concisely, “basis that gives way”, as the original form of 
the Chinese term kaidaoyi. It seems to me also possible that “basis that 
gives way” is a new expression used in Yogācāra texts to describe a fac-
tor that is understood as the “basis” (āśraya) and performs the function 
of avakāśadāna, “giving way [to subsequent awareness]”, which is parallel 
to samanantarapratyaya, “similar-immediate condition”, in traditional A-
bhidharma texts. That is to say, it is new only in the terminological sense, 
while the idea expressed by the term is adopted from the old system. 
As for Kuiji’s phonetic rendering of the first part of the compound kai-
daoyi as jielanduo = *krānta, if we assume that he has some kind of infor-
mation from commentarial materials which are not available to us, the 
form *krāntāśraya could be at most a variant of samanantara āśraya. In 
that case, the word *krānta, “preceding”, was probably used in these 
-------------------------------------------------- 
35 Thus, manas or “mind” has a double nature: it refers to the mental faculty, the sixth 
cognitive sphere; and it is also the designation of all awareness that has passed away 
in the immediately antecedent moment.  
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commentarial materials to explain the word samanantara, “immediately 
antecedent”, in the term samanantara āśrayaḥ. This probably led Kuiji to 
consider that *krāntāśraya should be rendered as cidiyuan, and samanan-
tara āśraya as dengwujianyuan.36  
3.5 With regard to the difference between *avakāśadānāśraya or “basis 
that gives way” and the traditional form, samanantarapratyaya, “similar-
immediate condition”, we find some interesting discussions. In fact, the 
former is easily confused with the latter.37 However, if we read the ma-
terials carefully, we find that they differ. 
According to the interpretation attributed to Dharmapāla, the basis 
that gives way must be a special kind of similar-immediate condition, but 
not that condition itself. He states clearly that being a similar-immediate 
condition is only one of three sine quibus non of being a basis that gives 
way. He says:  
Being a basis that gives way means: (1) being a factor that possesses 
an object-support (*sālambana)38; (2) being the principal [thought, i.e. 
citta, opposed to caitta, “thought concomitant”]39; and (3) having the 
function of similar-immediate condition.40 
-------------------------------------------------- 
36 Cf. above n. 5 and §2.2. 
37 For example, the Chinese term kaidaoyi is translated directly in Yao, 2005: 139-140 as 
“immediate contiguous conditions (samanantarapratyaya)”. 
38 AK(Bh) 23.1-3 (AK 1.34ab): sapta sālambanāś cittadhātavaḥ. cakṣuḥśotraghrāṇajihvākāya-
manovijñānadhātavo manodhātuś ca ete sapta cittadhātavaḥ sālambanā viṣayagrahaṇāt. 
“Seven thought-elements (cittadhātu) have an objective support (1.34ab). The thought-
elements, i.e., the elements of [the six internal cognitive spheres (āyatana), i.e.,] visual 
awareness, auditory awareness, olfactory awareness, gustatory awareness, tactile a-
wareness, mental awareness, and mind-element, have an object-support, because they 
grasp an object.” 
39 Cf. CWSL-SJ 390a13-15: 為主者。即簡一切心所法等。彼非主故。要主有力方可為依; 
“Being the principal thought means all thought concomitants are excluded, because 
they are not the principal thought. Only those which are the principal thought have 
the power [to be āśraya], and thus can be taken as the basis.”  
40 Cf. CWSL 21b13: 開導依者謂有緣法為主能作等無間緣 (cf. La Vallée Poussin, 1928: 
246). In AMV the sine quibus non of being the similar-immediate condition are also 
mentioned: being associated (saṃprayukta), having a basis (sāśraya), having an aspect 
(sākāra), being active (ābhoga) and having an object-support (sālambana) (cf. AK 2.34
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Kuiji, in commenting on this passage, also says:  
The basis that gives way (krāntāśraya=cidiyuan) is different from the 
similar-immediate condition (samanantarapratyaya=dengwujianyuan), 
which is one of four conditions (catuḥpratyaya). Any basis that gives 
way must be a [similar-]immediate condition, but some of the [simi-
lar-]immediate conditions are not a basis that gives way.41  
3.6 The difference between the terms “basis that gives way” and “simi-
lar-immediate condition” is obvious: The former term indicates the func-
tion and the latter the temporal property; the former has “basis” (āśraya) 
-------------------------------------------------- 
bcd: cittacaitasāḥ | sāśrayālambanākārāḥ saṃprayuktāś ca; “Thought and thought conco-
mitants have a basis, an object support and an aspect, and are associated”); thus, the 
dissociated conditioning factors ([citta]viprayuktasaṃskāra) cannot be the similar-
immediate condition. Cf. AMV 52b3-7: 問何故不相應行。非等無間緣。答若法相應。
有所依有行相。有警覺有所緣。彼法可立等無間緣。不相應行不爾。故非等無間緣 
(partly translated in Dhammajoti, 2009: 174). In another place in AMV, in replying the 
objection that the factors of thought and thought concomitants (cittacaittā dharmāḥ) in 
the antecedent moment could not be the similar-immediate condition of those in the 
subsequent moment, since such factors arise spontaneously on the strength of the 
retributive cause (*vipākahetubalāt), the same idea is repeated, but there it is added 
that these kinds of associated factors in the antecdent moment can serve the function 
of the similar-immediate condition, because they have the power of leading-arising 
and giving way to those in the subsequent moment, while the dissociated factors do 
not have such power, so they cannot be the similar-immediate condition. Cf. AMV 
52c7-11: 問若爾異熟心心所法。由異熟因勢力引起。任運而轉。前應非後等無間緣。
答心心所法。是相應有所依。有行相有警覺。有所緣故。前念於後有勝勢力。引發
開避。故皆是後等無間緣。不相應行與此相違。不可為例. On the issue of whether or 
not, in order to serve as the similar-immediate condition, the factor in the antecedent 
moment must be of the same kind as that in the subsequent moment, a divergence of 
opinions is presented in AMV; there an opinion related to this topic is reported (相似
相續沙門說曰), which seems to maintain that only the principal thought (and not 
thought concomitants such as vedanā) can serve the function of the similar-immediate 
condition, and it is also emphasized that the capacity of giving way is the characteris-





41 CWSL-SJ 390a8-10: 開導依者。與四緣中無間緣別。但是開導依必是無間緣。有是無
間緣非開導依. 
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at the end and the latter has “condition”. Besides this, the difference lies 
also in the fact that the former has a narrower extension than the latter 
– the former is included in the latter, but not vice versa. Indeed the term 
āśraya in the sense referring to past mind is used in AKBh. In AKBh 34.
9-16 (ad AK 1.44d) there is a discussion about the difference between the 
basis and the similar-immediate condition. It is said first that the five 
types of sensory awareness have the sense faculties as their co-nascent 
basis (sahaja āśrayaḥ), and also have “mind” as their past basis (atīta āśra-
yaḥ, cf. AKBh 34.9-10 quoted above in n. 6). Next, a dialectical apparatus 
of four alternatives (catuṣkoṭi) is used to explain the relationship between 
them. They are represented respectively by:  
(A) the visual sense;  
(B) the mental function (caitasika)42 as the element of factor (dharma-
dhātu)43 that has passed away in the immediately antecedent mo-
ment;  
(C) the mind that has passed away in the immediately antecedent mo-
ment; and  
(D) factors other than those mentioned above.44 
According to Yaśomitra’s commentary, in the case of (A), the visual sense 
is the basis for visual awareness, but not the similar-immediate condi-
tion. In the case of (B), the mental function as the element of factor that 
has passed away in the immediately antecedent moment is the similar-
immediate condition, but not the basis, because only the six faculties, i.e., 
-------------------------------------------------- 
42 Just as in the case of “(A)”, where only “the visual sense” is mentioned, but the mental 
faculty (manas) should also be implicated, here also “mental function” (=caitta “the 
thought concomitants”) must be representative in nature, not excluding thought 
(citta); because Vasubandhu also says in AK 2.62ab that all arisen thought and thought 
concomitants, except the final one [i.e., that of an Arhat] are similar-immediate [con-
ditions] (cittacaittā acaramā, utpannāḥ samanantaraḥ).  
43 Of course, here dharmadhātu should be understood in the ābhidharmika sense of the 
term, i.e., as one of the eighteen elements (aṣṭādaśa dhātavaḥ), different in technical 
meaning from the more familiar Mahāyāna dharmadhātu. 
44 AKBh 34.12-13: catuṣkoṭikaḥ. prathamā koṭiś cakṣuḥ. dvitīyā samanantarātītaś caitasiko 
dharmadhātuḥ. tṛtīyā samanantarātītaṃ manaḥ. caturthī koṭir uktanirmuktā dharmāḥ.  
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the five sense faculties and the mind, are accepted as the basis of aware-
ness. In the case of (C), the mind that has passed away in the immediate-
ly antecedent moment can be both basis and similar-immediate condi-
tion. And in the case of (D), factors other than those mentioned above 
refer to the dissociated factors, such as unconditioned factors.45 This dis-
cussion in the catuṣkoṭi-form can also be found in AMV46 and ADV.47 
3.7 Here, through the formulation of four alternatives, the difference 
between the basis and the similar-immediate condition is clearly demon-
strated: all parts of C (the mind that has passed away in the immediately 
antecedent moment) must be A (a kind of sense faculty), but only part of 
A can be C, this part being the mind (manas); and on the other hand, all 
parts of C (the mind that has passed away in the immediately antecedent 
-------------------------------------------------- 
45 Cf. AKV 99.30-100.13: prathamā koṭiś cakṣur iti. cakṣurvijñānasya cakṣur āśrayabhāvena, na 
samanantarapratyayabhāvena. na hi cakṣuś cittacaittasvabhāvam. cittacaittā acaramā utpan-
nāḥ samanantaraḥ [AK 2.62ab] iti ca samanantarapratyayalakṣaṇaṃ. dvitīyā koṭiḥ samanan-
tarātītaś caitasiko dharmadhātuḥ. tasya samanantarabhāvena. ṣaḍ eva hy āśrayā vijñānasyeṣ-
yante cakṣurādayo manaḥ paryantā nānye. tṛtīyā samanantarātītaṃ manaḥ. ubhayalakṣaṇa-
yuktatvāt. caturthī uktanirmuktā dharmāḥ. koṭitrayamuktā viprayuktā asaṃskṛtādayaḥ. 
46 Cf. AMV 369c22-27: 以是因緣應作四句。有法是眼識所依非等無間緣。謂俱生眼。
有法是眼識等無間緣非所依。謂無間已滅諸心所法。有法是眼識所依亦是等無間緣。
謂無間已滅意界。有法非眼識所依亦非等無間緣。謂除前相。乃至身識四句亦爾. 
47 Cf. ADV 40.6-15: kiṁ punar eṣāṁ cakṣurvijñānādīnāṁ sahaja evāśrayaḥ, āhosvid atīto ’pi? tad 
ucyate – paścimasyāśrayo ’tītaḥ. manovijñānasya kriyāvato nityam āśrayo ’tītaḥ. pañcānāṁ 
taiḥ sahāpi ca || pañcānāṁ vijñānakāyānāṁ taiḥ sahāpi cātītaś ceti caśabdāt. evaṁ catuṣkoṭika 
ārabhyate. ye dharmā vijñānaniśrayāḥ samanantarā api te. praśnaś catuṣkoṭikaḥ. niśraya eva 
cakṣurādayaḥ. samanantarā eva vedanādayaḥ. ubhayaṁ samanantaraniruddhaṁ vijñānam. 
nobhayam etān ākārān sthāpayitvā. “Further, do these visual awareness, etc., have only a 
co-nascent basis, or also a past one? The answer is as follows: The last [of the six 
awareness-elements] has the past [factor] as its basis. [This means,] the active (kri-
yāvat) mental awareness always has a past basis. The five [groups of sensory aware-
ness] are also simultaneous with their [bases]. The five groups of [sensory] awareness 
are simultaneous with their [bases], and yet they also have a past basis, because [the 
word] ca is used. [A discussion] in the form of four alternatives is formulated as fol-
lows: Are all factors that serve as the bases of awareness also immediate antecedents? 
This question [comprises] four alternatives: (A) [Sense faculties] such as the visual 
sense are only the bases; (B) [Mental factors] such as sensation are only immediate an-
tecedents; (C) Awareness [any of the six awarenesses] that has ceased to exist in the 
immediately antecedent moment is both [basis and immediate antecedent]; (D) [Any 
factor] other than these forms is neither.” 
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moment) must be B (all mental factors including both thought and 
thought concomitants), but only part of B can be C, this part referring to 
“principal thoughts”, namely the first six awarenesses; thus, C has a nar-
rower extension than B. This coincides nicely with Kuiji’s statement 
quoted immediately above. 
In summary, the relationship among the *avakāśadānāśraya or basis 
that gives way, the similar-immediate condition and their product, that 
is, awareness including visual awareness and mental awareness, can be 
illustrated as follows:  
moment 1 → moment 2 
samanantarapratyaya = 




4   Three interpretations of *avakāśadānāśraya 
4.1 As mentioned above, in Xuanzang’s CWSL it is reported that there are 
three divergent opinions about the nature and function of the *avakāśa-
dānāśraya, “basis that gives way”, which reflect in fact the different un-
derstandings of the relationship between two awarenesses in a thought 
series.  
It is well known that in CWSL, when a topic is under discussion, if 
there are a number of different interpretations they are normally re-
duced to several opinions attributed to groups headed by important 
interpreters, such as Nanda, Sthiramati and Dharmapāla. Also, Dharma-
pāla’s opinion is normally given after that of Sthiramati or others, and is 
regarded as the final and decisive voice; for Dharmapāla is seen as the 
orthodox interpreter of Vasubandhu’s TrK, among the ten interpreters 
whose views are canvassed.48 Furthermore, throughout the whole work, 
on numerous topics, the opinion of Sthiramati is reported as a criticism 
of Nanda’s interpretation, and Dharmapāla’s interpretation is in turn 
-------------------------------------------------- 
48 CWSL-SJ 232a8-12: 製此釋者雖十論師。於中護法聲德獨振。故此論題特以標首。此
師所說最有研尋。於諸義中多為南指。邪徒失趣正理得方。迥拔眾師穎超群聖者。
其惟一人乎. 
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presented as a criticism of Sthiramati. Indeed, there are controversies 
between Sthiramati and Dharmapāla regarding many crucial issues; 
however, as we will see below, in the case of the interpretation of the 
function of the basis that gives way, they do not differ sharply. 
4.2 The first opinion is attributed in Kuiji’s commentary to Nanda et al.49 
The main position of this opinion is explained in CWSL as follows: 
Some say: The five [sensory] awarenesses cannot continue from a 
previous moment to a subsequent moment as the same type [such as 
visual awareness in the previous moment and subsequent moment] or 
as different types [such as visual awareness in the previous moment 
and auditory awareness in the subsequent moment], since they come 
into being necessarily through the projecting force (yinsheng 引生, 
*ākṣepābhinirvṛtta) of the sixth awareness [in the previous moment]; 
therefore, they take exclusively the sixth awareness as their basis that 
gives way. [On the other hand,] because the sixth awareness can con-
tinue as the same kind [of awareness in previous and subsequent 
moments], and because it also comes into being through the projec-
ting force of the five [types of] awareness [in the previous moment], it 
takes the first six types of awareness [in the previous moment] as its 
basis that gives way. [Furthermore,] because the seventh and eighth 
awarenesses can maintain continuity as the same [type of awareness 
in previous and subsequent moments], and because they do not come 
into being through the projecting force of other awarenesses, they 
take only themselves as the basis that gives way.50  
4.3 Nanda’s opinion can be summarized as follows: The five types of 
sensory awareness cannot continue for two moments; consequently they 
come into being in dependence on the “projecting force” (ākṣepa) of 
mental awareness and take only this awareness as their basis that gives 
way; while mental awareness takes the five types of sensory awareness 
-------------------------------------------------- 
49 CWSL-SJ 387c19-20: 云後開導依至不相續故。述曰。即是難陀等長徒之義.  
50 CWSL 21a4-8: 有義五識自他前後不相續故。必第六識所引生故。唯第六識為開導依。
第六意識自相續故。亦由五識所引生故。以前六識為開導依。第七八識自相續故。
不假他識所引生故。但以自類為開導依 (cf. La Vallée Poussin, 1928: 242). 
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as well as another mental awareness, i.e., the same kind of awareness in 
the antecedent moment, as its basis that gives way. This opinion is in-
deed, as I see it, close to the Maulī bhūmi of YBh, which reflects the realis-
tic aspect of the earlier Yogācāra, where it is said: 
And it is not the case that the five groups of awareness arise simulta-
neously (saha) in two moments, nor is it the case that they arise one 
from the other immediately one after the other; [rather] immediately 
subsequent to the five groups of awareness that arise in a single mo-
ment, mental awareness necessarily arises. Sometimes, immediately 
subsequent to these [five groups of awareness, attention (manaskāra)] 
is distracted [elsewhere], and an auditory awareness or any other one 
of the five groups of awareness may arise thereafter. When this [at-
tention] is not distracted, only mental awareness, called “discerning 
[thought]” (niścita), [would arise] thereafter. Two kinds of mental 
awareness, i.e., searching [thought] (paryeṣakaṃ [cittam]) and discern-
ing [thought] (niścitam [cittam]), conceptualize the object.51 
To a certain extent, this opinion is also similar to Dharmakīrti’s explana-
tion of the similar-immediate condition, i.e., mental awareness (or “men-
tal perception”) is produced by sensory awareness (or “sensory percep-
tion”) in the immediately antecedent moment, functioning as the simi-
lar-immediate condition.52 
-------------------------------------------------- 
51 YBh (ed.) 58.13-19: na ca asti pañcānāṃ vijñānakāyānāṃ saha dvayoḥ kṣaṇayor utpattiḥ, na 
apy anyonyasamanantaram anyonyotpattiḥ. ekakṣaṇotpannānāṃ pañcānāṃ kāyavijñānānām 
(read vijñānakāyānām, cf. YBh (T) 30a4: rnam par shes pa’i tshogs lnga po dag gi, YBh (C) 
291b3: 五識身) anantaraṃ manovijñānam avaśyam utpadyate. tadanantaraṃ kadācid vi-
kṣipyate, tataḥ śrotravijñānaṃ vā anyatamānyatamad vā pañcānāṃ vijñānakāyānāṃ. sa cen 
na vikṣipyate. tato manovijñānam eva niścitaṃ nāma. tābhyāṃ ca niścitaparyeṣakābhyāṃ ma-
novijñānābhyāṃ sa viṣayo vikalpyate. For a detailed discussion of the earlier Yogācāra 
position with regard to the relationship between two awarenesses in two moments in 
connection with the theory of the five types of thought (citta) including the “discern-
ing thought” and “searching thought” mentioned here, cf. Chu, forthcoming. 
52 Cf. PVin 19a-c (19.3-4): mānasam cākṣavijñānāntarapratyayodbhavam | tadarthānantara-
grāhi. “And mental [perception] arises from sensory awareness as its immediate condi-
tion, and grasps the object-referent of the latter in the immediately subsequent mo-
ment.” Cf. also PVin 19.5-6: mānasam apīndriyajñānena samanantarapratyayena svavi-
ṣayānantarakṣaṇasahakāriṇā janitaṃ pratyakṣam. “Also mental [awareness], produced by 
sensory cognition as its similar-immediate condition with its own object-field in the 
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As a matter of fact, in the earlier period of development of the Yogā-
cāra system, to which the Maulī bhūmi of the YBh belongs, the Yogācāras 
share the same doctrines in many aspects with the realistic systems, the 
Sautrāntika, or the Sarvāstivāda. In AMV we read an interesting passage 
which mentions the different opinions between the Yogācāra and the 
Abhidharma teachers with regard to the same topic: 
Question: Does [each type among] the five awarenesses, such as visual 
awareness, come forth (*pratyupasthita) immediately one after the 
other (anyonyasamanantaram) [and thus maintain its continuity]? An-
swer: The Yogācāra teacher says that [each type among] the five 
awarenesses, such as visual awareness, does not come forth immedi-
ately one from the other, because they all arise immediately from 
mental awareness. However, the Abhidharma teachers say that [each 
of] the five [types of] awarenesses, such as visual awareness, can arise 
immediately [one from the other].53 
Here, it is also clearly said that Yogācāra maintains that the five groups 
of awareness do not arise from the same kind of awareness; rather, they 
are necessarily produced by mental awareness, a position similar to 
Nanda, et al. This can be regarded as the position of the Yogācāra at its 
early stage.54 
Disregarding the point that mental awareness can additionally have 
an awareness of the same kind in the immediately antecedent moment 
as its basis that gives way, the salient point of Nanda et al.’s position is 
that the five types of sensory awareness (symbolized as “S”) and mental 
awareness (symbolized as “M”) come forth one after another in succes-
sion, which can be represented thus:  
Nanda: S(/M)→M→S(/M)→M→ … 
-------------------------------------------------- 
immediately subsequent phase as the auxiliary factor [for its arising], is a kind of 
perception.” Cf. also the similar statement in NB 1.9: svaviṣayānantaraviṣayasahakāri-
ṇendriyajñānena samanantarapratyayena janitaṃ tan manovijñānam. 
53 AMV 682b2-4: 問眼等五識展轉無間現在前不。答諸瑜伽師說。眼等五識展轉無間
不現在前。皆從意識無間生故。阿毘達磨諸論師言。眼等五識展轉皆得無間而起。 
54 I will discuss this topic in more detail in Chu, forthcoming. 
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[“(/M)” indicates the disregarded requirement that mental awareness can 
have another mental awareness in the antecedent moment as its basis that 
gives way.] 
4.4 This opinion is criticized and refuted by the second opinion, attribu-
ted in Kuiji’s commentary to a group of interpreters headed by Sthira-
mati et al.55 The refutation starts straightforwardly as follows: 
Some [others] maintain: The above-mentioned opinion is not charac-
terized by thorough reasoning (*pariniṣṭhayukti). Granted that, when 
the first five groups of awareness are in the state (avasthā) of not pos-
sessing supernatural power (*a-vaśitā), obtaining (*lābha, etc.) [an ob-
ject spontaneously] or [obtaining] a non-distinctive object (*a-viśiṣṭār-
tha), [they can be non-continuous], as [the opponent] says.56 But, 
when they are in the state of possessing supernatural power, as in the 
case of Buddhas and so on who possess the supernatural power in re-
spect to the object, [i.e., cross-modality,] employing any sense faculty 
[in respect to any object] interchangeably, determining [objects] ef-
fortlessly (anābhogena) without the medium of seeking [thought] 
-------------------------------------------------- 
55 Cf. CWSL-SJ 388a16: 論。有義彼說未為究理。述曰。安惠等解 (in Yao, 2005: 139–140, 
this opinion is incorrectly attributed to Dharmapāla; in fact, Dharmapāla’s opinion is 
reported in the next passage, beginning with the phrase “someone else maintains”, 
有義; cf. CWSL 21b12). In CWSL, the discussion of Sthiramati et al.’s opinion is extend-
ed with quotations from YBh, and some special theories are also involved, such the 
theory of five types of thought (citta) and the theory of mental awareness accompany-
ing the five groups of sensory awareness; furthermore, this opinion is associated in 
Kuiji’s commentary with Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccya, etc. (cf. CWSL-SJ 420c21-22: 集
量論等五俱意識定現量者。必同緣故). All of these points require a separate study, 
which is provided in Chu, forthcoming.  
56 Cf. Kuiji 388a25-388b1 (ad loc.:且前五識未自在位。遇非勝境可如所說): 一未自在位。
二率爾遇境位。三遇非勝境位。上一位言通下二處。次一遇言貫下第三。後境之言
復通第二; “[Here, three mental states are mentioned]: First, the state of not having 
supernatural power; second, the state of obtaining the object spontaneously; third, the 
state of obtaining a non-distinctive object. [In this sentence] the word wei (位, *ava-
sthā) in the first item also applies in other two; and the word yu (遇, lābha, etc.) in the 
second item also applies in the third; further, the word jing (境, viṣaya) in the last item 
applies in the second.” According to this explanation the sentence should be read as: 
五識未自在位、遇、非勝境. 
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(*paryeṣakaṃ [cittam]), why [then] would these five groups of aware-
ness not be continuous?57 
As we mentioned above, the key point of the opinion of Nanda et al. is 
that the five types of sensory awareness and mental awareness take each 
other as their basis, and arise one after the other; that means, of course, 
that the five types of sensory awareness are not continuous, but rather, 
are interrupted by mental awareness while proceeding from the first 
moment to the second moment in the series. By contrast, according to 
Sthiramati et al., sensory awareness, accompanied by mental awareness, 
can be continuous; only in the special cases where sensory awareness 
grasps the object spontaneously or the object is not a distinctive one, so 
that cognition involves no mental activity such as attention (which is 
mental awareness by nature), can sensory awareness be non-continuous; 
but, even so, this holds good only for those who have not arrived at the 
stage of possessing the supernatural power of controlling their sense fa-
culties, and not for the Buddha, and so on.  
Further, according to the principle of mental awareness accompany-
ing sensory awareness, the opinion of Nanda et al. is challenged by Sthi-
ramati et al. as follows: 
When the five [types of] awareness arise, there must be a mental 
awareness to give rise to the mental awareness of the subsequent 
moment. Why does [this later mental awareness] need the five [types 
of] awareness as its basis that gives way?58 
4.5 In the opinion of Sthiramati et al., the five types of sensory awareness 
take the same kind of awareness in the antecedent moment as their basis 
that gives way, so that they maintain their continuity; and immediately 
-------------------------------------------------- 
57 CWSL 21a9-12: 有義前說未有究理。且前五識未自在位。遇非勝境可如所說。若自
在位。如諸佛等於境自在。諸根互用任運決定不假尋求。彼五識身寧不相續 (cf. La 
Vallée Poussin, 1928: 242f.).  
58 CWSL 21a27: 五識起時必有意識能引後念意識令起。何假五識為開導依. 
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after their arising they are accompanied by mental awareness.59 The 
conclusion of Sthiramati et al. is summarized in CWSL as follows: 
It should be said that the five [types of] awareness take all six aware-
nesses in the antecedent moment as their basis that gives way; [be-
cause the five types of sensory awareness are themselves continuous, 
and also come into being through the projecting force of another 
awareness, i.e., the mental awareness, they can arise without inter-
ruption60]. The sixth awareness takes the antecedent [awareness] of 
its own kind as its basis that gives way, or takes the seventh and the 
eighth awarenesses [when it arises in the five thought-free (acittakam) 
states, i.e. the ideationless realm, absorption in ideationlessness, ab-
sorption into the cessation of ideation, sleep, and fainting].61 
That is to say, the relationship between sensory awareness and mental 
awareness is that they are not temporally separated in two different 
moments; rather, they exist in tandem in both moments: in the ante-
cedent moment, both of them serve the function of the basis that gives 
way for their successors in the subsequent moment; in the subsequent 
moment, sensory awareness, being the extension of the same kind of 
awareness in the antecedent moment and continuously produced by 
mental awareness in the antecedent moment as its basis that gives way, 
is further accompanied upon its arising by a mental awareness which 
takes the awareness of its own kind in the antecedent moment as its 
basis that gives way. This opinion can be presented as follows:  
Sthiramati: S/M→S/M→S/M→ … 
-------------------------------------------------- 
59 These two points in Sthiramati et al.’s opinion, i.e., (1) the five types of sensory aware-
ness are continuous and (2) they are accompanied by mental awareness, along with 
other relevant theories, are discussed in more detail in Chu, forthcoming. 
60 Cf. Kuiji’s comment in CWSL-SJ 389c18-19: 五識以前六識皆得為依。自相續故。他引
生故。得次無間生. 
61 CWSL 21b8-9: 應說五識前六識內隨用何識為開導依。第六意識用前自類或第七八為
開導依; cf. CWSL-SJ 389c22-23: 五位無心時。或第七。八為依; cf. also the five 
thought-free states listed in TrK, 16 where it is stated that mental awareness arises in 
every case with the exception of these five thought-free states (acittaka): manovijñāna-
saṃbhūtiḥ sarvadā āsamjñikād ṛte | samāpattidvayān middhān mūrchanād apy acittakāt.  
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[“/” means the simultaneity of the two events.] 
4.6 Finally, this second opinion, in its turn, is criticized and refuted by 
the third opinion attributed to the group of interpreters led by Dharma-
pāla.62 This third opinion reads as follows: 
Some say: This theory is not reasonable, either…One [awareness] can 
be explained as having the power of giving way to the other [aware-
ness], when it does not occur simultaneously with the latter. Since the 
eight awarenesses in one personal existence (*ekakāye) are accepted 
as arising simultaneously, how can these heterogeneous [awarenesses] 
(*visabhāga) be the basis that gives way [of one other]? If they are 
regarded as the basis [that gives way for one other], they should not 
occur simultaneously; but then, [the resulting doctrine] would fall 
into line with the other [Hīnayāna] schools (*parapakṣa),63 which 
maintain that thoughts do not occur simultaneously.64 
Here, Dharmapāla’s point is that awarenesses of different kinds, such as 
sensory awareness and mental awareness, since they exist simultane-
ously, cannot serve as the basis that gives way for one other.  
Dharmapāla continues by saying that in one personal existence differ-
ent kinds of awareness occur simultaneously, and their number is inde-
terminate, i.e., the substratum awareness (ālayavijñāna) exists together 
with anything from one to seven kinds of awareness; if they are all 
-------------------------------------------------- 
62 CWSL-SJ 390a2-4: 論。有義此說亦不應理。述曰…此護法釋. 
63 The Dārṣṭāntika takes the clear position that thought and thought concomitants do 
not arise simultaneously; cf. AMV 79c7-11: 謂或有執心心所法。前後而生非一時起。
如譬喻者。彼作是說。心心所法依諸因緣前後而生。譬如商侶涉嶮隘路。一一而度
無二並行。心心所法亦復如是; “That is to say, there are some who hold that thought 
and thought concomitants arise one after the other, and do not arise simultaneously. 
For example, the Dārṣṭāntika say that thought and thought concomitants arise in the 
antecedent or subsequent moments according to causes and conditions. It is just as, 
when the members of a caravan go through a narrow mountain pass, they pass 
through one by one, but not two side by side; thought and thought concomitants are 
the same.” 
64 CWSL 21b13-17: 有義此說亦不應理…若此與彼無俱起義。說此於彼有開導力。一身
八識既容俱起。如何異類為開導依。若許為依應不俱起。便同異部心不並生 (cf. La 
Vallée Poussin, 1928: 246). 
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regarded as similar-immediate conditions of one another, then the num-
ber of the antecedent awarenesses serving as similar-immediate condi-
tion and of the subsequent awareness would be unequal, and also matter, 
etc. (rūpādi) could be a similar-immediate condition, as is maintained in 
the Hīnayāna system; this would be contradictory to the noble treatise 
(聖說, śāstra) that accepts only thought and thought concomitants as the 
similar-immediate condition.65 Here, the argument apparently has as its 
background a discussion presented in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha. In that text, 
the Hīnayāna66 idea is refuted that material and thought (rūpacitta) is 
the “seed” (bīja) or the condition qua cause (hetupratyaya), and thus the 
substratum awareness (ālayavijñāna) postulated by the Yogācāra does not 
need to exist; in this context it is said that material and thought can be at 
most the similar-immediate condition, but never the condition qua 
cause.67 Thus, it is said in CWSL that in that text the mentioning of mat-
-------------------------------------------------- 
65 CWSL 21b18-20: 又一身中諸識俱起。多少不定若容互作等無間緣。色等應爾。便違
聖說等無間緣唯心心所. Here, “noble treatise” refers to the passage in YBh; cf. above 
n. 14. 
66 According to the sub-commentary, this refers to the Sautrāntika, who maintain that 
matter in the antecedent moment immediately produces matter in the subsequent 
moment; also thought and its associated (saṃprayukta) dharma in the antecedent mo-
ment immediately produces thought in the subsequent moment... cf. Lamotte, 1973: 
77.  
67 Cf. MS §1.55 (TP 221.2.4-6): gang yang gzugs dang sems kyi mjug thogs su ’byung ba chos 
rnams kyi sa bon nyid du rtog pa de yang gong ma bzhin du mi ’thad kyi steng du gzugs med pa 
dang | ’du shes med pa nas shi ’phos pa dang | ’gog pa’i snyoms par ’jug pa las langs pa’i de yang 
mi rung ngo | de ma thag pa’i rkyen du rung ba ma gtogs par dgra bcom pa’i tha ma’i sems 
kyang mi rung bar ’gyur ro; = MS (X) 137a15-17: 若復有執色心無間生。是諸法種子。此
不得成如前已說。又從無色無想天沒。滅定等出不應道理。又阿羅漢後心不成。唯
可容有等無間緣; “Again, also the idea (vikalpa) [of the Sautrāntika] that the uninter-
rupted production (anantarotpāda) of matter and thought is the seed of the dharmas is 
not correct, as stated above (in MS 1.23). Furthermore (upari), it is also impossible [for 
this matter and thought to be the condition qua cause] in cases [where no matter and 
thought exist, such as in] those who have transmigrated (cyuta) into the formless (ārū-
pya) and ideationless [realms], and those who have arisen (vyutthita) from the medita-
tive attainment of cessation [of ideation] (nirodhasamāpatti), etc. It is also impossible 
that the final thought of an Arhat (antyacitta) [should be a condition that gives rise to 
another thought,] except that it is possible for it to be the similar-immediate condition” 
(cf. Lamotte, 1973: 77, Nagao, 1982: 244). 
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ter as similar-immediate condition is a concessionary statement for the 
sake of argument; that is to say, it grants the Hīnayāna idea that matter 
and thought in the antecedent and subsequent moments are in the rela-
tion of similar-immediate condition, for the purpose of refuting the 
claim that they are the condition qua cause (hetupratyaya); but, in fact, 
matter cannot be regarded as the similar-immediate condition, for in 
that case the number of the antecedent awarenesses serving as similar-
immediate condition would be unequal to the number of the subsequent 
awareness (since besides thought, matter would also be taken as a simi-
lar-immediate condition), and thus the element “similar” (sam-) in the 
term “similar-immediate condition” would serve no purpose; if Sthira-
mati et al. were to say that sam- does not limit the number of similar-im-
mediate conditions, but simply indicates the homogeneity (sabhāga) of 
similar-immediate conditions, this would be contradictory to their own 
assertion that a heterogeneous awareness can be the similar-immediate 
condition.68  
4.7 Dharmapāla et al.’s position concludes as follows: 
Therefore, each of the eight kinds of awareness has only the [aware-
ness] of its own kind (*svajāti) as its basis that gives way. This con-
forms very well to the scriptural tradition as well as to reasoning, be-
cause [awareness], insofar as it is of the same kind, cannot occur si-
multaneously.69 
Thus, Dharmapāla et al.’s position is that mental awareness cannot be 
caused by sensory awareness as its similar-immediate condition, or vice 
versa. That is to say, Dharmapāla et al. hold to the strict principle that 
each kind of awareness can only have its own kind of awareness in the 
antecedent moment as its similar-immediate condition. This opinion can 




間緣. For the interpretation of this passage, cf. CWSL-SJ 390b8-18; cf. also La Vallée 
Poussin, 1928: 247. 
69 Ibid., 21b25: 是故八識各唯自類為開導依深契教理。自類必無俱起義故. 
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Dharmapāla: S→S→S→ … / M→M→M→ … 
[“/” means the parallelism of the two series of events]  
4.8 For Sthiramati, when the five awarenesses take awareness of their 
own kind in the antecedent moment as their basis that gives way, being 
always accompanied by mental awareness, they by definition also take 
mental awareness in that moment as their basis that gives way, since 
mental awareness and sensory awareness are never separated. However, 
Dharmapāla perceives a contradiction between the fact that one aware-
ness is the basis that gives way of another awareness, and the fact that 
these two still occur simultaneously.  
In fact, however, the difference between these two interpreters is trif-
ling. Both of them accept the simultaneous arising of multiple kinds of 
awareness. The point on which Dharmapāla disagrees with Sthiramati is 
that Sthiramati accepts that five types of awareness also take mental 
awareness, in addition to sensory awareness, as their similar-immediate 
condition; that is to say, Sthiramati does not strictly enforce the princi-
ple that the function of the similar-immediate condition can be per-
formed only by an awareness of its own kind. Indeed, Sthiramati himself 
does not reject the idea of “similarity” (sam-) between the antecedent 
awareness functioning as the similar-immediate condition and the sub-
sequent awareness conditioned by the antecedent one, for he also stipu-
lates, in his own work, that a thought, being the similar-immediate con-
dition of the subsequent thought, cannot be separated from that subse-
quent thought by any other kind of thought;70 however, in contrast to 
-------------------------------------------------- 
70 Cf. ASBh 37.23-28.1 (ad AS 29.9-10): nairantaryasamanantarato ’pīti nāvaśyaṃ kṣaṇanair-
antaryaṃ kiṃ tarhi cittāntaranairantaryam apy atra nairantaryaṃ draṣṭavyam itarathā hy a-
cittikasamāpattau vyutthānacittasya samāpatticittaṃ na samanantarapratyayaḥ syāt. bhavati 
ca. tasmād ekasmin saṃtāne paścimasya cittasya pūrvakaṃ cittaṃ cittāntareṇānantaritaṃ 
samanantarapratyayaḥ. yathā cittam evaṃ caitasikā api veditavyāḥ. “Due to its being simi-
lar-immediate, viz. without interval, as well as…This does not necessarily mean [that 
there is] no interval between moments; rather, here, [a state in which there is] no in-
terval between thoughts [even if other moments do intervene] is also to be regarded 
as the immediate. For otherwise, the thought at [the inception of the thought-free] 
meditative attainment (samāpatticitta) would not be the similar-immediate condition 
of the thought [after] arising (vyutthānacitta) from that thought-free meditative attain-
ment (acittikasamāpatti) [since there is an interval of thought-free moments between 
these two thoughts], but [in fact] it is. [This is because there is no other kind of 
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Dharmapāla, he places the emphasis on the continuity of thought. In the 
case of the five awarenesses, as discussed above, even though they take 
mental awareness in the antecedent moment as their similar-immediate 
condition, they can maintain continuity under the condition that they 
are accompanied by mental awareness, and are not separate from the 
latter. 
4.9 The fact that Dharmapāla does not disagree with Sthiramati on the 
fundamental point that sensory awareness and mental awareness can 
arise simultaneously, and thus can have a common object, can be con-
firmed in his commentary on Dignāga’s ĀP. Commenting on the meaning 
of the word “etc.” (等 = la sogs pa) in the first sentence “those who 
maintain that the external object is the object-support of the visual cog-
nition, etc.”,71 he introduces an interesting discussion. Although the 
meaning of this passage is not completely clear to me in every detail, the 
gist is surely as follows. According to Dharmapāla, realistic systems hold 
that the object of the five types of sensory awareness is real, while that 
of mental awareness is unreal – they make a clear-cut distinction be-
tween the nature of the object of sensory awareness and that of mental 
awareness.72 Based on this assumption, it is held that the target of Dig-
nāga’s refutation is merely the existence of the object of the five types of 
sensory awareness, and not the object of mental awareness, because the 
latter does not need refutation.73 
-------------------------------------------------- 
thought between them.] Therefore, within one [thought-]series, the antecedent 
thought, not being separated by any other kind of thought, is the similar-immediate 
condition of the subsequent thought. Thought concomitants are also to be understood 
in just the same way as thought.” A similar idea can also be found in Yaśomitra’s com-
mentary on AK 1.17a, AKV 41.28-32. For a more detailed study of Sthiramati’s position 
in this regard, see Chu, forthcoming. 
71 ĀPV TD 86a6-7: gang dag mig la sogs pa’i rnam par shes pa’i dmigs pa phyi rol gyi don yin 
par ’dod pa de dag... 
72 Cf. GSYYL-SJ 821a8: 此推他宗執根識不同意識所緣; and ibid. 821a12: 此句。乃護法
師。斥他宗一向執眼等五識。緣極微和合為真實之事。意識不然非一向故者. 
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However, according to Dharmapāla, such a clear-cut distinction is 
problematic in respect to the relationship between sensory awareness 
and mental awareness. He continues by pointing out that in that case the 
following problem would arise: 
If this were the case [i.e. if mental awareness never grasped the real 
object that is cognized by sensory awareness], how could it be pos-
sible that mental awareness in every case comes into being through 
the projecting force (*ākṣepābhinirvṛtta) of sensory awareness? [Men-
tal awareness cannot come into being through the projecting force of 
sensory awareness, for in that case] this [mental awarenesses] could 
neither [arise] simultaneously with sensory awareness, nor in the im-
-------------------------------------------------- 
故。今此但觀聞思生得智之境也。如斯意識所緣之境。全成非有。此於自聚。不能
緣故。復緣過未。非實事故。猶若無為。為此等言。攝五識身; “Here, the word ‘etc.’ 
includes all five types of awareness based on the material sense faculties (*rūpiṇām 
indriyāṇām) as accepted by other realist systems [such as the Sarvāstivāda]. This is be-
cause according to these systems, this kind of awareness always takes really existent 
things as its object-support; mental awareness is different, because it does not always 
do so, [that is to say,] because it can also take conventionally existent things, such as a 
chariot, as its object-support. Even if it were accepted that mental awareness can take 
a real thing as its object-support in one moment, [after that moment (cf. GSYYL-SJ 
821a18: 此謂意識緣境。一剎那頃。即離境而緣)] it would still grasp a mental image 
similar to [that object], separate from that object; [whereas] in the case of visual 
awareness etc., [the awareness] is never separated from the object. Since [the doctrine 
of the realistic systems] can be established only by taking this [distinction between the 
object of sensory awarenesses and that of mental awareness] for granted, no effort 
needs to be made [to examine the object of mental awareness]. And this is also because 
the visible matter [consisting in atoms (cf. GSYYL-SJ 821b6: 即假想觀中極微色也) ap-
prehended through cognition resulting from contemplation is definitely not the field 
(*gocara) of [mental awareness such as] reasoning (tarka) or the [verbal] determination 
of the [imagined] view [of atoms (cf. ibid. 821b9: 是意識緣本質色安立名言。即彼妄
執假想觀中分析極微)]. Only by observing the object of hearing and thinking can 
[mental] cognition arise (ibid. 821b14: 意謂但觀聞思境。生得意識智). Thus, the ob-
ject taken by mental awareness [in the distracted state (vikṣiptaṃ)] as object-support is 
completely non-existent, because in this [awareness] both [the atom] itself and the ag-
gregate [of atoms] cannot be apprehended (cf. ibid. 821b17-18: 此於自聚不能緣故者。
自乃極微。聚名和合。此又謂意識不能緣極微和合為境), and because the ob-
ject-support in the past or the future is not really existent, just like the unconditioned 
[factor] (asaṃskṛta). For these reasons, through the use of the word ‘etc.’ all five groups 
of sensory awareness are included [but mental awareness is excluded].” 
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mediately subsequent moment, because in both cases it takes the visi-
ble matter, etc., that have ceased to exist (*niruddha), as its object-
support. Or [you may say:] it takes the present thing as its object-
support; then, because this [object-support] has not been experienced 
(*anubhūta) by sensory awareness, the mental awareness itself would 
take the external object per se directly as its object-support [indepen-
dent of the sensory awareness]. This would lead to the unwanted con-
sequence (*iti prasajyate) that there was no blindness, deafness, etc.74 
4.10 According to the sub-commentary, this passage serves the purpose 
of refuting the doctrine of other systems (他宗, *parapakṣa), which do 
not accept that the mental awareness takes the five [sensory] object-
referents (*pañcārthāḥ) as its object-field simultaneously with the five 
[sensory] awarenesses.75 “Other systems” here refers, of course, to the 
realistic systems that assume the separation of sensory awareness from 
mental awareness. Indeed, for these systems, it is a problem to explain 
causality between these two kinds of awareness, but not for Sthiramati 
and Dharmapāla, who both follow the Yogācāra. The Yogācāra, which 
-------------------------------------------------- 
74 ĀPṬ 889b4-8: 若爾根識引生所有意識。斯乃如何。非此共其根識同時。或復無間。
皆滅色等為所緣故。或緣現在。此非根識。曾所領故。斯乃意識自能親緣外境體性。
此則遂成無聾盲等. A similar problem is also discussed by Jinendrabuddhi in his PSṬ: 
cf. PSṬ 51.13-52, 1: tatra manovijñānam indriyagṛhītam evārthaṃ gṛhṇāti tato vānyam iti 
dvayī kalpanā. yadi pūrvā, tatas tasya prāmāṇyam eva na syāt, gṛhītagrahaṇāt smṛtyādivat. 
atha dvitīyā, tadāndhāder apy arthagrahaṇaṃ syāt. indriyajñānanirapekṣaṃ hi manovijñā-
naṃ yadi bāhye ’rthe pravartate, tadā cakṣurādivikalasyāpi darśanaṃ prāpnoti. “In this re-
gard there are two alternatives – namely, mental awareness grasps precisely the ob-
ject that is grasped by the sensory [awareness]; or [an object] other than that. If the 
first were the case, this [mental awareness] would certainly not be a valid means of 
cognition, because it is an apprehension of what has already been apprehended, like 
recollection. Alternatively, if the second [alternative] were the case, then a blind per-
son etc. could also grasp the object. For, if mental awareness, independent of sensory 
awareness, came forth in respect to the external object, then a person without the 
visual sense would have sight.” This is based on PV 3.239: pūrvānubhūtagrahaṇe māna-
sasyāpramāṇatā | adṛṣṭagrahaṇe ’ndhāder api syād arthadarśanam; “If mental [awareness] 
apprehended what had already been previously apprehended, it would not be a valid 
means of cognition; [on other hand,] if it apprehended what is not seen, a blind man 
would also see things.” The argument is valid only under the assumption that mental 
awareness apprehends an external object. 
75 GSYYL-SJ 821c4: 此破他宗。不許意識。與五識同時緣五塵為境. 
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regards the object of sensory awareness as equally unreal with that of 
mental awareness, can solve this problem easily by maintaining that 
mental awareness, as a phase of the continuum, is caused by the aware-
ness of the same kind that arose simultaneously with sensory awareness 
in the antecedent moment, and accompanies the present sensory aware-
nesses. Thus, mental awareness and sensory awareness share the same 
object. Dharmakīrti’s solution is different: he says that mental awareness 
arises from sensory awareness as its immediate condition, and it grasps a 
different object than that which has been grasped by sensory awareness. 
Thus, since mental awareness also depends on sensory awareness, the 
unwanted consequence that a blind man would also perceive the object 
is avoided.76 This approach is evidently based on the Sautrāntika posi-
tion. 
5   Conclusion 
On the basis of the above study, we can arrive at the following conclu-
sions: 
1. The Chinese term kaidaoyi reflects a different version of samananta-
rapratyaya, referring to the awareness that has passed away in the imme-
diately antecedent moment, called “mind”, which has the function of 
giving way in order for the subsequent awareness to arise. The first part 
of the compound, kaidao, expresses exactly this function; thus, it must be 
a translation of the Sanskrit word avakāśadāna. This word is widely used 
in the texts of both the Abhidharma and the Yogācāra to describe the 
function of the so-called “mind” that passed away in the immediately 
antecedent moment.  
2. In the Yogācāra system, a set of terms is used to describe the cause 
of the arising of thought and thought concomitants (cittacaitta), which 
-------------------------------------------------- 
76 Cf. PV 3.243: tasmād indriyavijñānānantarapratyayodbhavaṃ | mano ’nyam eva gṛhṇāti viṣa-
yaṃ nāndhadṛk tataḥ; However, “grasps a different object” is omitted in his later work, 
cf. NB 1.9: svaviṣayānantaraviṣayasahakāriṇā indriyajñānena | samanantarapratyayena jani-
taṃ tan manovijñānam; “The mental awareness is engendered by the sensory awareness 
as its similar-immediate condition with the object-field of the latter in the immedi-
ately antecedent moment as the auxiliary [condition].” 
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end with “basis” (āśraya), such as “basis in the sense of seed” (bījāśraya), 
“co-existent basis” (sahabhūr āśrayaḥ) and “similar-immediate basis” 
(samanantara āśrayaḥ). This is parallel to the fourfold “condition” (praty-
aya), i.e., condition qua cause (hetupratyaya), dominant condition (adhi-
patipratyaya), similar-immediate condition (samanantarapratyaya) and ob-
jective condition (ālambanapratyaya), which was already used in the old 
Abhidharma texts. It is exactly the “similar-immediate condition” that is 
now named in CWSL the “basis that gives way”; both of them refer to the 
same thing: that awareness that has passed away in the immediately an-
tecedent moment, which is called “mind”. Thus, the special term kaidaoyi, 
which is introduced into the discussion of the relationship between men-
tal awareness and the five types of sensory awareness in Xuanzang’s 
CWSL, is not a translation of the Sanskrit word *krāntāśraya, as Kuiji’s 
phonetic transcription jielanduo suggests, but rather, of *avakāśadānāśra-
ya, “basis that gives way”. 
3. Concerning the function and the nature of this *avakāśadānāśraya, 
controversies among three different interpretations are reported in 
CWSL. The first opinion, represented by Nanda et al., holds that the five 
types of sensory awareness cannot continue for more than one moment, 
and come into being in each moment in dependence on the “projecting 
force” (ākṣepa) of mental awareness, taking only mental awareness as 
their basis that gives way; while mental awareness takes the five types of 
sensory awareness as well as another mental awareness (of its own kind) 
in the antecedent moment as its basis that gives way; thus, the five types 
of sensory awareness and mental awareness come forth one after ano-
ther in succession. The second opinion, attributed to Sthiramati, et al., 
maintains that the five types of sensory awareness take the same kind of 
awareness as well as mental awareness that accompanies the sensory 
awareness in the antecedent moment as their basis that gives way, so 
that they maintain their continuity; and upon their arising they are ac-
companied by a further mental awareness; thus, sensory awareness and 
mental awareness are not temporally separated in two different mo-
ments, but rather, always arise in tandem. Finally, the third opinion, 
promoted by Dharmapāla, et al., holds that each of the eight kinds of 
awareness has only the awareness of its own kind as its basis that gives 
way; thus mental awareness cannot be caused by sensory awareness as 
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its similar-immediate condition, or vice versa; this opinion adheres to the 
principle that each kind of awareness can only have its own kind of 
awareness in the antecedent moment as its similar-immediate condition. 
The difference between the last two opinions is not significant; both of 
them accept the simultaneous arising of multiple kinds of awareness. 
The point on which they differ is that the second opinion accepts that 
the five types of awareness also take mental awareness, in addition to 
sensory awareness, as their similar-immediate condition, while the third 
opinion strictly adheres to the principle that the awareness serving as si-
milar-immediate condition must be of the same kind as the subsequent 
awareness. However, Dharmapāla does not differ on the fundamental 
point that mental awareness and sensory awareness arise simultaneous-
ly, for he also considers that the mental awareness, arising simultane-
ously with sensory awareness, can share the same object with the latter.  
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